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In several previously reported studies, participants increased their normative correctness
after being instructed to think hypothetically, speciﬁcally taking the perspective of an
expert or researcher (Beatty and Thompson, 2012; Morsanyi and Handley, 2012). The
goal of this paper was to investigate how this manipulation affects risky or delayed
payoffs. In two studies, participants (n = 193) were tested online (in exchange for money)
using the adjusting procedure. Individuals produced certain/immediate equivalents for
risky/delayed gains. Participants in the control group were solving the problem from their
own perspective, while participants in the experimental group were asked to imagine
“what would a reliable and honest advisor advise them to do.” Study 1 showed that
when taking the perspective of an expert, participants in experimental group became
more risk aversive compared to participants in the control group. Additionally, their certain
equivalents diverged from the expected value to a greater extent.The results obtained from
the experimental group in Study 2 suggest that participants became less impulsive, which
means they tried to inhibit their preferences. This favors the explanation, which suggests
that the perspective shift forced individuals to override their intuitionswith the social norms.
Individuals expect to be blamed for impatience or risk taking thus expected an expert to
advise them to be more patient and risk aversive.
Keywords: risk, intertemporal choices, expert, dual-process theory, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Human life presents continuous choices. In this text, we will focus
on choices made in risk conditions (sticking to a permanent post
vs. starting your own business) and intertemporal ones (buying
an iPad vs. saving money). Studies have shown that people make
mistakes in both areas, which can lead to serious social problems,
such as gambling or obesity.
Overwhelmingmedia advertisements andmarketing strengthen
impulsive behaviors in the modern society. This results for
an example in obesity and ﬁnancial debts. Nowadays, people
are often facing artiﬁcial risky problems (stock market, inﬂa-
tion) for which they are not prepared (for extended review, see
Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012). This suggests a need to provide sup-
port to people so they can make more rational decisions, especially
those that are intertemporal and risky.
One of the recently introduced methods to support thinking,
speciﬁcally reasoning, is hypothetical thinking. People are asked
to assess a problem from the perspective of an expert or researcher
(Beatty and Thompson, 2012; Morsanyi and Handley, 2012). This
usually results in increased normative correctness of their mental
processing. Our aim is to test this method in a new ﬁeld of cog-
nition, that is, decision-making under risk and delay. We hope to
validate the method of taking the perspective of an expert as an
efﬁcient debiasing method.
DECISIONS UNDER RISK
Uncertainty about the future is an inherent part of human exis-
tence. While there are events we can be sure of and others that
are impossible to predict, most of us have to deal with probabilis-
tic situations. Studies on choices in risky conditions show that
people have difﬁculty understanding information about probabil-
ities. In a classic study, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) showed
that when people assess the probability of events, they tend
to ignore base rate information and instead rely on the social
stereotype.
One of the main assumptions of prospect theory is that in
risky situations, people underestimate moderate and large proba-
bilities but overrate rare events (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Failure to understand the rules of probability theory as well
as the fact that people overrate small probabilities are possi-
ble causes for the high percentage of people participating in
different types of gambling. Despite the unfavorable proﬁt-to-
risk ratio, studies have shown that 82% of adult Americans
(Welte et al., 2002), 72% of Canadians (Azmier and Clements,
2001), and 68% of adult British citizens (Wardle, 2007) admit
to gambling. Even part of the stock market investors treat
investing as a substitute of gambling. (Markiewicz and Weber,
2013).
Biased perception of randomness is a challenge in the health-
care domain. For example, in the medical context, there is the
question of informing patients about the probability of various
diseases. Much empirical evidence has shown that people have
serious problems estimating small probabilities. In particular,
people are insensitive to changes in the magnitude of these prob-
abilities (Kunreuther et al., 2001; Siegrist et al., 2008; Tyszka and
Sawicki, 2011).
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 989 | 1
Białek and Sawicki Debiasing decisions by taking the expert perspective
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES
Intertemporal choices present people with different challenges. In
everyday life and in politics or economic affairs, some decisions
are based on choosing between payments that occur at a time
different from the time when the decision is made. For example,
deciding whether to eat fast food immediately or wait for a bal-
anced meal is based on the same psychological mechanisms as
deciding whether to spend your proﬁt immediately or invest it.
The issue of intertemporal choices is also examined in terms of
self-control, for example, not succumbing to temptation. In the
classic research commonly known as the marshmallow test,Walter
Mischel offered a four-year-old child a sweet and said if the child
decided not to eat it, he or she would soon get two marshmallows.
The experimenter then left the room, leaving the child alone with
the temptation. If the child did not wait, he or she got only one
marshmallow instead of two. The results showed that people who
had greater self-control when they were children, scored higher on
the SAT test several years later, exhibited fewer behavioral prob-
lems, coped betterwith stress, andweremore focused and attentive
(Mischel et al., 1989).
The inability to defer gratiﬁcationmay also lead to serious social
problems, such as obesity. Obesity is estimated to be the seventh
leading cause of mortality in the world (Ezzati et al., 2002). In
2007–2008, 68% of adults in the US were overweight, and 33.8%
of them were obese (Flegal et al., 2010).
SOCIAL NORMS AND NORMATIVE MODELS
For many cognitive processes there is a normative model, which
states what is correct (e.g., logic for reasoning). For risk taking,
multiplication of gain and probability of its occurrence expected
value (EV) is used as a normative model. Those who expect more
for a lottery than its EV are overly risk seeking, and those who
expect less thank the EV are risk averse. The intertemporal choices
do not have a normative model, but because of changes in our
societies and extended lifespan, patience (to some degree) is seen
as rational.
Social norms also regulate the behavior. Typically, patience
and the ability to avoid acting impulsively are virtues (Haidt and
Joseph, 2004). Children are rewarded when they show the ability
to postpone reward.
Rational, according to the normative model of risk taking,
would be to take a well calculated risk. It is unknown whether
there are any consistent social norms regarding risk-taking, but
experiencing a loss because of risk-taking (action) is blamed more
than missing a chance to proﬁt (omission, Ritov and Baron, 1990,
1995). This happens because people expect to be blamedwhen tak-
ing the risk, and risk avoidance can be seen as a socially accepted
behavior.
METHODS IMPROVING DECISION MAKING
Some studies have focused on debiasing individuals in their con-
clusions and decisions. These studies introduced different types
of instruction or additional information to help people override
their initial, biased intuitions. There are two, usually implicit,
assumptions behind these manipulations.
First group of researchers tries to inform people about the
normative models and procedures (presenting people with the
concept of validity, EV or base rates). They assume that people
are making mistakes because they lack the appropriate knowledge
or intuitions regarding the ﬁeld of probability or logic (or mind-
ware, as called by Stanovich, 2009b). In this view, an efﬁcient
method of debiasing would be a request to rely on a speciﬁc, for-
mal procedure, e.g., “being presented with the concept of logical
validity, please try to assess following conclusions according to
their validity” (Evans et al., 1993).
The other group of researchers believes that biased thinking is
not a result of the lack of appropriate knowledge but of cognitive
miserliness (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), which means that individuals
are making biased decision because of lack of available cognitive
resources and/or motivation to use reﬂexive processing. When
motivated and having enough time, individuals show less biased
decision-making. In this view, an efﬁcient method of debiasing is
an instruction that relates to the procedure, supporting a deeper
and reﬂexive thinking. An example of such instruction would be,
“please try to override your initial beliefs and focus on the logi-
cal structure of presented problems,” like used by Moutier et al.
(2002).
Both approaches did not produce any satisfying and consis-
tent increase in normative correctness of decisions. Despite the
consensus in the literature that debiasing requires decoupling of
the intuitions with effortful processing (Croskerry et al., 2013),
it seems that people are having troubles willingly override their
initial beliefs, even when instructed to do so and when they are
motivated and have appropriate knowledge.
In contemporary literature, we can also ﬁnd other meth-
ods of improving individual’s cognitive processing. Hypothetical
thinking can increase the normative correctness of decisions by
increasing chances of using effortful, rule based processing (called
Type 2, Evans and Over, 1996; Evans, 2007) but also inhibit-
ing intuitive and heuristic responses (Type 1 processing). For
example, Loewenstein et al. (2001) instructedparticipants to imag-
ine the consequences of both presented alternatives, and thus
debiased people from the vividness effect. Lord et al. (1984)
instructed their participants to imagine the opposite when con-
sidering social dilemmas (e.g., capital punishment). Thanks
to this strategy, they improved the objectivity of their judg-
ments. Baron (2008) proposed open-minded thinking to help
override simple heuristic-cued intuitions. Trippas (unpublished
doctoral dissertation) showed that cognitive style, understood as
willingness to engage in Type 2 processing rather than cogni-
tive ability, inﬂuences accuracy of reasoning. This suggests that
human cognition can be improved by encouraging people to think
hypothetically (Type 2 processing).
Considering a problem from an expert’s perspective is quite
a natural instruction. People typically perceive experts as unbi-
ased and reliable sources of information. When taking an expert’s
perspective, intuitions and emotions should play a minor role,
and thanks to this manipulation, reﬂexive processing (1) should
be used more often compared to standard cases and (2) should
override the internal conﬂict with intuitions.
In some studies, the instructing participants to take the
experts perspective effectively encouraged the use of Type 2
processing, leading to less biased human performance (see
Greenhoot et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2005; Ferreira et al., 2006;
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Beatty and Thompson, 2012). However,when testing children, the
effect of the instruction was ambiguous. The instruction, “please
answer the questions taking the perspective of a perfectly logical
and rational person (pp. 328),” as used in the study of Chiesi et al.
(2011), seemed to work only for high cognitive ability individuals.
This is possibly a result of the lack of learned rules and procedures,
which could be applied to the task in the reported study or lack of
cognitive resources. We can assume that the rules of thinking, just
like driving a car, require much more cognitive resources when
they are just learned while requiring fewer resources with greater
practice (Stanovich, 2009a).
QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
As stated in the introduction section, people make many mistakes
when dealingwith risk and delay, what results inmany social prob-
lems, like debts, gambling, obesity, and many more. The presented
literature suggests that instructing people to reﬂect on a problem
from the perspective of an expert can signiﬁcantly improve the
performance. We expect our participants to produce less biased
decisions in the ﬁeld of risk and delay management.
The performance in risky condition is expected to be more
consistent with the behavior predicted by EV normative model.
This would provide an evidence of less biased risk assessment.
Theperformance in intertemporal choices is expected to change
direction toward bigger patience. The ability to focus on bigger
but more delayed goals seems to be more adaptive in mod-
ern society than is impulsivity; thus, our manipulation should
boost patience. This assumption does not follow from any nor-
mative model, as in the case of risk; instead, the general social
norm supports patient behavior rather than short-term oriented
behavior (Haidt and Joseph, 2004). Hence, we expect partici-
pants to follow the social norm of impulsivity avoidance and
produce lower discounting strength in the experimental condi-
tion in which participants are instructed to take the perspective of
an expert.
STUDY 1
We investigated the effect of forced hypothetical thinking on
choices under risk. Situations, such as considering how much
one is willing to invest to get a higher but uncertain return,
are everyday problems, but the form of presenting the problem
is relatively artiﬁcial, and people are evolutionally not prepared
to deal with such problems. In other words, people can intu-
itively deal with risk, but the way they are presented increases
the chance of making a biased decision (Gigerenzer and Selten,
2002).
By improving these types of judgment, we could enhance peo-
ple’s entrepreneurship abilities aswell as prevent risky,maladaptive
behaviors, such as gambling or smoking. The hypothetical think-
ing can possibly increase the use of other competing intuitions or
rule-based processing. Both should change the risk taking decision
in a more normative manner and help people accurately estimate
the EV of potential gains.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The certain equivalent of a potential gain of $5000 with a prob-
ability of 90, 70 and 30% was computed for every participant.
The experimental manipulation was an instruction, asking par-
ticipants to consider the problem from one of two perspectives,
experts‘ or own. Our manipulation should increase abstract hypo-
thetical thinking by taking the perspective of an expert1. Through
this manipulation, we expected to debias human reasoning and
discover the mindware responsible for risk management. The
following is an example of tasks used:
Imagine you have received a $5000 reward, which will be paid to you with
a 70% chance. An investment fund is willing to rebuy your reward with
a certain payment. Imagine what an honest and rational expert would
advise you to do – accept or refuse the given offer.
ADJUSTING PROCEDURE
The research scheme used in all experiments was based on the
adjusting method, which is most popular in the discounting
research (Yi et al., 2006; Benzion et al., 2011; Odum, 2011).
This procedure enables one to determine balance points, i.e.,
payment methods where the person being tested was indiffer-
ent to two given alternatives, for example, between receiving a
sum x immediately and a sum y after a period of time t (in
research on risky choices, between receiving a sum x for cer-
tain, and a sum y with a determined probability). Thanks to
the adjusting method, the overestimation of expected gains can
be prevented, which is common if individuals are asked directly,
e.g., how much they would expect for having to wait for their
gain.
The research was conducted using a specially developed com-
puter program, which enabled us to determine the balance points.
The characteristic feature of the adjusting method is that one
choice alternative adjusts its value depending on previous deci-
sions made by the person being tested. For example, during the
test on risky payments, two cards depicting sums were displayed
on the screen, one was bigger but uncertain (the card on the
right side of the screen), and the other was smaller and certain
(the card on the left side of the screen). The sum on the card
on the right was ﬁxed, while the card on the left changed its
value depending on the subsequent choices of the person being
tested.
The participant’s task was to choose between the two alterna-
tives. With every question, the person being tested was to choose
one of the values (certain or uncertain). In the ﬁrst step, the par-
ticipant was given a choice of $2500 for sure (information on
the card on the left side) or $5000 with a 70% chance of win-
ning (information on the card on the right side). After choosing
the risky option, in the following step, the certain sum increased
by half of its previous value. Hence, this time, the person being
tested could choose $3750 for sure or $5000 with a 70% chance
of winning. When the participant chose the risky option once
more, the certain value increased by half of the previous value
and amounted to $4375 ($3750 + $625) in the subsequent step.
However, if in the next step ($4375 for sure or $5000 with a
70% chance of winning), the person being tested chose the cer-
tain sum, its value decreased by half of the previous change (by
1We have also manipulated the ownership of the gain (deciding for myself or for
somebody else’s gains), but it produced neither main effect nor interaction; thus,
we do not report this manipulation in more details.
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$312). To sum up, the certain value was adjusted to reﬂect pre-
vious choices of the person being tested. After making the sixth
choice, the program calculated the equivalent point for the risky
alternative.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (n = 105) were citizens of the United States recruited
by specialized company in exchange for payment. They were ran-
domly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. From this
group, 27 participants who answered illogically (e.g., they wanted
to receive more for a 30% chance of winning compared to 70%
chance) were removed from the database prior to any further anal-
ysis. Mean age, gender distribution, and number of individuals in
each experimental condition are presented in Table 1.
RESULTS
When a person is risk averse his subjective value of a lottery is
lower. Figure 1 presents a line that connects mean subjective val-
ues of each lottery computed for the own/expert perspective and
compared to the EV model. We can see that individuals who took
the perspective of an expert were more risk averse. Additionally,
their result is further from the normative EV line compared to the
control group individuals who solved the problem from their own
perspective.
To measure the attitude towards risk, the area under the curve
was analyzed2 (Myerson et al., 2001). The surface of the area
under the curve is the sum of all trapezes set by the next balance
point values in relation to the ordinate and abscissa (Figure 2).
By using this measure, one should ﬁrst assign the values in the
range (0, 1) to a scale of delay and the subjective value of the
discounted values. In the case of the scale of delay, values are
subsequently divided by the highest delays used. The scale of
subjective values of the discounted sums is converted in a sim-
ilar way. Next, we calculate the sum of the ﬁelds of the created
trapezes using the formula (a2–a1) [(b1 + b2)/2], where a1 and
a2 are consecutive delays while b1 and b2 represent consecutive
subjective values of gains. The area under the empirical dis-
counting curve is therefore the sum of all trapezes. The smaller
the area under the curve the bigger is the risk aversion of an
individual.
Attitude toward risk was computed for each participant. Later,
the parameters were compared across experimental groups. The
2This measure has two signiﬁcant advantages compared to an alternative analysis,
which is based on comparing discounting parameters. First, it reduces the level of
skewness compared to the analysis of the distribution of discounting parameters
(k); second, it is neutral, i.e., it does not refer directly to any speciﬁc mathematical
formula.
Table 1 | Information about participants in Study 1.
Experimental condition N Ratio of females Mean age (SD)
Expert perspective 39 38.5 34.077 (9.94)
Control group 39 43.6 33.58 (8.58)
Overall 78 41.0 33.8 (9.24)
general linear model showed the main effect of perspective
[F(1,78) = 7.634; p < 0.01; η2 = 0.091]3, and the participants
in the experimental group showed bigger risk aversion. The mean
areas under the curve are shown in Figure 3. The bars represent
the mean ﬁeld under the curve, with higher value indicating more
positive attitude toward risk (lower risk aversion).
DISCUSSION
We found that taking the perspective of an expert signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced the risky choices. Individuals in the experimental con-
dition were more risk aversive. By comparing the choices in the
study to the line representing the EV,we can conclude that the deci-
sions made in the experimental condition were less normatively
correct.
This result is contrary to our expectations because previously
reported studies in other domains suggested that the perspective
manipulation increases the normative correctness of decisions.
There are two possible explanations. First, the concept of EV is
not known to participants or the social norm for risky decisions
(risk avoidance) was made less salient thanks to the perspective
shift. The ﬁrst explanation seems less probable, as already children
intuitively compare lotteries bymultiplying gains and probabilities
(Schlottmann, 2001). But if individuals would follow the social
norm would expect to be blamed for unsuccessful risk taking and
thus avoid doing so to greater extent.
Morsanyi and Handley (2012) showed that the use of Type 2
processing does not guarantee the correctness of thinking. Par-
ticipants instructed to think from the perspective of a rational
person focused even more on stereotypes instead of base rates
when solving a lawyer’s task (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973).
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there
were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen par-
ticipant of this study. Jack is 36 years old. He is not married and is
somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science
ﬁction and writing computer programs.
Most of individuals endorsed the conclusion that Jack is an
engineer. They showed more interest in social stereotype than
in the probability of occurrence of a speciﬁc event and answered
against the odds. This case is especially interesting for understand-
ing the naïve probabilities that humans calculate. Here, taking a
rational perspective (Type 2 processing) exacerbated the neglect
of base rates.
In other study, Pennycook et al. (2014) showed that the base
rates are available at an intuitive level, so the increase of biased
responses in referred Morsanyi and Handley study is a cor-
rupted mindware case, where a social stereotype was judged
as a more reliable source of information compared to the base
rates. Additionally, in the ﬁeld of risky decision, the instruc-
tion manipulation or enhancement of hypothetical thinking did
not consistently improve the performance (Weinstein and Klein,
1995). The manipulation of instructions (hypothetical thinking)
could possibly increase efﬁciency when one has the appropriate
mindware: knows how to calculate the probability and how to
3The analysis on full population of participants showed also a signiﬁcant main effect
of the perspective manipulation [F(1,104) = 5.187; p < 0.05; η2 = 0.077]. By the
elimination of irrational responses, we wanted to reduce a possible noise and report
most reliable effect of the study.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean certain equivalents for own/expert perspective compared to expected value model.
FIGURE 2 |The diagram shows four trapezes created as a result of
connecting equivalent points, with the risk axis by line segments. Both
the risk and subjective value of the sum are standardized from the range
from 0 to 1. Value 1 on the risk axis corresponds to a certain value, and on
the subjective value axis the non-discounted sum. Own elaboration based
on: Myerson et al. (2001).
use it in real-life social problems. If the mindware is missing, the
performance can be even worse (Chiesi et al., 2011).
STUDY 2
The aim of the second study was to investigate the effect of forced
hypothetical thinking on intertemporal choices. Such situations
are everyday problems, where one has to think about how much
he/she is willing to invest now to get a higher but delayed return.
By improving that type of judgment, we could persuade peo-
ple to improve health or prevent such maladaptive behavior as
overeating.
This assumption does not follow from any normative model, as
in the case of risk, but the general social norm supports patience
FIGURE 3 | Mean area under the curve for uncertain gains.
rather than short-term oriented actions (Haidt and Joseph, 2004).
Thus, we expected participants to follow the social norm of impul-
sivity avoidance and produce lower discounting strength in the
experimental condition of taking the perspective of an expert.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We repeated the procedure of Study 1. The only difference was that
individuals had to evaluate three delayed gains. The delay was set
for 1 month, 6 months, and 24 months. Once again, participants
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions,
own perspective or the perspective of an expert. Additionally, in
Study 2, wemanipulated the ownership of themoney (ownmoney
or someone else’s money), but this manipulation produced no
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main effect anddidnot interactwith the perspectivemanipulation;
thus, it will not be reported in following analysis.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (n = 130) were citizens of the United States recruited
by external services in exchange for payment. They were randomly
assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Details of the
group are presented in Table 2. A small group of participants
(n = 15) was excluded because of irrational responses (the same
criterion as in Study 1 was used).
RESULTS
The discounting curves that connect balance points for delayed
gain of $5000 are presented in Figure 4, from which we can see
that when taking the perspective of an expert, people show less
impulsivity compared to the control condition (own perspective).
General linear model analysis was used to test the inﬂuence of
possession and perspective on discounting strength. Once again,
a main effect of perspective has been found [F(1,114) = 4.168;
p < 0.05; η2 = 0.036]4. The mean discounting strength is
presented in Figure 5.
DISCUSSION
Taking the perspective of an expert improves thinking by helping
individuals overcome impulsivity. Participants taking an expert’s
perspective were less likely to lose some of their money by receiv-
ing it sooner and not having to wait compared to considering a
problem from their own perspective. We can conclude that indi-
viduals’ mindware related to delay management is governed by
a rule, where impulsivity is assessed as wrong, and the correct
behavior is patience. This belief is then in conﬂict with the intu-
itive willingness to receive immediate rewards. This is consistent
with common observations that people are sometimes consciously
aware of the internal conﬂict between their intuitions (impulsivity,
Type 1 processing) and beliefs about correct response (patience,
Type 2 processing).
Despite the lack of normative model, we can conclude that
the patience in this speciﬁc task presented here is adaptive; thus,
it should be evaluated positively. This internal conﬂict should
emerge when the mindware response is made salient by taking
the perspective of an expert. De Neys (2014) stated that when the
emotional arousal emerges after the conﬂict detection and an indi-
vidual notices it, the heuristic response could be questioned. This
can decrease the impulsivity, as it is a heuristic response.
4As requested by reviewer, we tested gender as a factor in the GLM analysis and
found no main effect or interaction (both p > 0.5).
Table 2 | Information about participants in Study 2.
Experimental condition N Ratio of females Mean age (SD)
Experts perspective 62 35 34.4 (10.31)
Own perspective 53 57.9 37.5 (11.46)
Overall 115 46.15 35.91 (10.92)
FIGURE 4 | Discounting curves for delayed gains.
FIGURE 5 | Discounting strength for delayed gains.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The perspective shift changed human decisions. Participants
showed bigger patience and risk aversion. The results in the area
of risk are not consistent with our expectations. The decisions
made cannot be seen as more correct or rational. The intertempo-
ral choices have shown an improvement, as the discounting rate
shown by individuals decreased. This can help individuals over-
come temptations and help them make long-term ﬁnancial plans
(savings, investments).
Possible explanation of observed behavior is that individu-
als focused on social norms rather than on normative models.
This would be consistent with ﬁndings of Chiesi et al. (2011)
and Morsanyi and Handley (2012) who reported no consistent
improvement or even decrease in correctness of decisions under
the forced perspective shift. We discuss, that the experimen-
tal manipulation made the social norm salient and people who
took experts’ perspective focused on the social norm to big-
ger extent, than in typical, everyday decision. Because patience
and cautiousness are socially perceived as virtues we see a
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change of decisions to match those. This assumption is consis-
tent with the reported ﬁndings on the improvement of thinking
and reasoning presented in the introduction section. The social
norm related to thinking promotes reﬂexive and logical think-
ing, that is, the Type 2 processing. The mindware responsible
for dealing with risk is still a main topic for research on risk
and delay management, but social norms related to this topic
have to be investigated more and incorporated in the design of
studies.
Our data did not fully support presented conclusion, as we have
not tested the social norms of participants. We assume that the
cultural norm should have some effect on most individuals. The
proverb “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” is a good
example of socially accepted risk avoidance. The hypothesis of
social norms made salient could be tested by comparing cultures
with big differences in the delay management or in the attitude
toward risk.
Despite possible difﬁculties, the idea of improving individu-
als’ decision-making in the area of risk and delay seems to be
worth effort. Individuals perform sub-optimally even in advanta-
geous conditions (with all required information provided and no
time pressure) and require to be supported. Modern society cre-
ated an artiﬁcial environment (e.g., by marketing, commercials)
in which people are misinformed or put under time pressure; thus,
human decision-making needs to be supported to greater extent,
particularly by hypothetical thinking with the focus on a speciﬁc
instruction.
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